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Participants in student loan programs must repay loans in full regardless of whether they complete
college. But many students who take out a loan do not earn a degree (the dropout rate among college
students is between 33 to 50 percent). We examine whether insurance against college-failure risk can
be oered, taking into account moral hazard and adverse selection. To do so, we develop a model that
accounts for college enrollment, dropout, and completion rates among new high school graduates in the
US and use that model to study the feasibility and optimality of oering insurance against college failure
risk. We nd that optimal insurance raises the enrollment rate by 3.5 percent, the fraction acquiring a
degree by 3.8 percent and welfare by 2.7 percent. These eects are more pronounced for students with
low scholastic ability (the ones with high failure probability).
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11 Introduction
More than 10 million students took out $95 billion worth of college loans in 2008. While the use of student
loans is widespread, there is considerable nancial risk of taking out a college loan. Many students who
obtain college loans do not complete college and therefore fail to earn a college degree. Using the 1990 Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) document that 50 percent of people who
enroll do not complete college. Using the NCES data and surveys, we nd that 37 percent and 35 percent
of students enrolled in 1989-90 and 1995-96, respectively, do not possess a degree and are not enrolled in
college ve years after their initial enrollment.
There is also the risk that the return to a college degree may turn out to be lower than expected (post-
college earnings risk). While the latter source of risk is important and has garnered a lot of attention
((Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro, 2005; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante, 2008)), the risk of failing to
complete college has important adverse consequences for earnings as well. This is because there is a large
and growing college degree premium.
This particular nancial risk of college loans is evident in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). For
the ve surveys conducted between 1992 and 2004, the percentage of non-students with a student loan who
report not having either a 2- or 4-year college degree is 47 percent, on average. Furthermore, non-students
with loans but without a degree have a signicantly higher education and consumer debt burden. The ratio
of median education debt to median income among non-students with student loans, 10 or more years after
rst taking out the loan was, on average, 0.15 for students without degrees and 0.102 for degree holders.
The nancial risk of taking out a student loan and being unable to complete college may discourage some
people from enrolling in college. Thus, even though prospective students may not be credit constrained, a
mechanism to share the risk of failing to complete college { college failure risk { might improve the welfare
of enrolled students and encourage more people to enroll and complete college.1 Given this, the aim of this
paper is to explore reasons why this nancial risk is not insured. There may be some underlying friction that
prevents this insurance from being oered, or, alternatively, there may not be much value (given underwriting
costs) in oering this insurance. This paper explores the second possibility. It answers the question: How
much would the welfare of prospective students increase if insurance is oered against the risk of failing to
complete college?
1Recent research in the education literature provides support for the fact that nancial constraints during college-going
years are not crucial for college enrollment (Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Cameron and Taber (2001)). Rather, it is student
characteristics, such as learning ability, that determine the decision to enroll. Given the generosity of the student loan program,
funds are readily available and eligible high school graduates invest in college if they perceive the returns to a college education
to be high enough (Ionescu (2009a)).
2We build a model consistent with enrollment and completion behavior under the current student loan
program. Using this model, we consider the value of oering insurance against the risk of college failure in
the form of partial loan forgiveness. We conduct our investigation under two important constraints. First, we
require that the insurance scheme not distribute resources from people with a high probability of completion
to people with a low probability of completion (and vice versa). Formally, this requires that the insurance
program be self-nancing with respect to each person who chooses to participate. The current programs
enforce this self-nancing constraint regardless of whether the program participant actually graduates from
college. We will permit failures to pay less than graduates, but each participant will pay the full cost of
college in expectation.
Second, we require that the insurance program guard against moral hazard and adverse selection. In this
context, moral hazard means that the provision of insurance induces students to stop putting in eort in
college. But as we show in the quantitative part of the paper, moral hazard is not an issue because of the
large college premium in earnings: the vast majority of students will not nd it attractive to reduce eort in
college to simply get a portion of their college expenses forgiven { they will lose much more in terms of lost
access to the college premium. On the other hand, adverse selection is an important issue. In our context,
adverse selection means that students who, prior to the introduction of insurance, chose to drop out may
choose to stay in college without putting in eort in order to collect on the insurance (bad risks pooling with
good risks). For instance, if the insurance program forgave all college expenses for failures, dropouts (who
were not planning on completing college anyway) would be induced to stay on campus, not put in eort,
fail, and collect on the insurance (in other words, the insurance scheme will induce dropouts to consume
leisure at the expense of the good risks). This is the main constraint on the provision of insurance. Thus,
the insurance scheme needs to guard against adverse selection rather than moral hazard.
The current operation of the program suggests that it is administratively feasible to oer some insurance.
Under the current system, a borrower can choose from a menu of fairly sophisticated repayment options
(standard, graduated, income-contingent and extended repayment). Nevertheless, under each of these pay-
ment options, the borrower is required to repay the entire loan and associated interest expenses regardless
of whether he or she completed college. We will examine whether it is feasible to forgive a portion of the
loan for students who fail out of college.2
In the theoretical section of the paper, we develop a simple model of a student's enrollment and college
eort decisions. The model postulates the necessary heterogeneity in student characteristics in order to be
consistent with the diversity of enrollment and eort decisions we see in reality and the importance generally
assigned to ability heterogeneity and self-selection into college attendance and completion by researchers
2The borrower is permitted to discharge her loan only if a repayment eort over 25 years does not fully cover all obligations.
3(see, for instance, Venti and Wise (1983)). The heterogeneity is in a student's utility cost of putting eort
into college and his or her outside option, neither of which is directly observable to loan administrators. The
unobserved heterogeneity complicates the task of providing insurance. These complications are analyzed in
the theoretical section and the constrained optimization problem that delivers the optimal insurance program
is developed.
In the quantitative section, we calibrate the model to US data on college enrollment, leaving, and com-
pletion rates as well as the average college costs of program participants, distinguishing between students
of dierent scholastic ability levels as measured by SAT scores. We quantify the eects of insurance on
enrollment and completion rates as well as welfare. The optimal insurance oered in case of non-completion
ranges between 10 to 45 percent of total college cost. The insurance scheme induces an increase in the
enrollment rate of 3.5 percentage points and an increase in college graduates of 3.8 percentage points. Al-
though insurance draws in students with a high risk of failure, completion rates rise because fewer students
voluntarily leave college. Insurance increases welfare by 2.7 percent on average. Thus, we nd puzzling the
fact that such an insurance is not oered. As we will show in the quantitative part of the paper, we take a
conservative approach in oering insurance. We run robustness checks and show that with a less restrictive
insurance mechanism, the welfare gains are even larger.
There is a rich literature on higher education, with important contributions focusing on college enrollment
and completion. Studies that take a quantitative-theoretical approach have given a prominent role to the
risk of college failure. These include studies by Akyol and Athreya (2005); Caucutt and Kumar (2003);
Garriga and Keightley (2007); Ionescu (2009b); Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). But these studies do not
generally consider the possibility of providing insurance against this risk. One exception is Ionescu (2009b),
who studied the eects of alternative bankruptcy regimes for student loans. She shows that individuals
with relatively low ability and low initial human capital levels are aected to a greater degree by the risk of
failure and the option to discharge one's debt under a liquidation regime helps alleviate some of this risk.3
Also, with the exception of Garriga and Keightley (2007), none of these studies recognize that students may
choose to drop out.
However, the empirical research on college behavior calls for a careful modeling of college dropout be-
havior. Manski and Wise (1983) argue that college students learn over time about what college means and
given this learning some choose to drop out. In addition, they suggest that college preparedness is more im-
portant than college aspiration for college completion. Furthermore, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008)
show that most of the attrition among students from low-income families cannot be attributed to short-
3Although insurance against college failure risk is not the focus of their paper, Akyol and Athreya (2005) observe that the
heavy subsidization of higher education directly mitigates the risk of college failure by reducing the college premium.
4term credit constraints. In a companion paper, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2009) provide evidence on
the relative importance of the most prominent alternative explanations for dropout behavior and nd that
learning about ability plays a particularly important role in this decision. Among other possible factors of
importance, they nd that students who nd school to be unenjoyable are unconditionally much more likely
to leave. But this eect seems to arise to a large extent because these same students also tend to receive
poor grades. In our model, dropout behavior will arise for similar reasons.
Our paper is related to studies that focus on merit-based policies. Our insurance arrangement can be
interpreted as being merit based: as we show later in the paper, the insurance premium is lower for higher
ability types and the amount of insurance oered is higher as well. However, unlike merit-based aid, our
insurance arrangement has no aid or grant component { it is self-nanced with respect to each individual
who participates, in expectation. Caucutt and Kumar (2003) analyze various types of college subsidies and
conclude that merit-based aid that uses any available signal on ability increases educational eciency with
little decrease in welfare. Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2008) examine the partial and general equilibrium
eects of wealth-based and merit-based tuition subsidies on the distribution of education and earnings. In
related work, Redmon and Tamura (2007) use a Mincer model of human capital with ability dierences to
characterize the optimal length of schooling by ability class and the importance of school district composition
for growth and distribution.
The key contribution of this paper is to construct a theory consistent with the reality of college enrollment,
leaving and completion behavior as well as returns to education and use it to design an insurance scheme for
student loans against the risk of failing at college, recognizing adverse selection and moral hazard. In addition,
we map the model to the data and quantify the eects of alternative insurance arrangements on enrollment,
completion and welfare. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the choices available
to a student. Section 3 lays out the key predictions of this model when no insurance is oered and compares
these predictions to patterns in the data. Section 4 develops the constrained optimization problem that
delivers the optimal insurance scheme. Parameter selection and calibration of the model are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 presents the results of oering insurance in the calibrated model and Section 7 concludes.
2 Facts
In this section, we report the basic facts that motivate the specic model of college enrollment and completion
developed in this paper. The rst fact is that students vary with respect to their preparation for college,
which in turn aects their probability of success. We use SAT scores as an indicator for college preparation.
Table 1 gives the distribution of students who took the SAT in 1999.
5Table 1: Distribution of SAT scores
SAT scores 0   699 700   900 901   1100 1101   1250 1251   1600
Fraction 0.079 0.224 0.342 0.205 0.15
As shown in Table 2, there is considerable diversity of behavior within these observably dierent groups
of students. We use the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS:88) to collect information on the
college enrollment choices of students who were high school seniors in 1992. We consider a student to be
enrolled in college if he or she enrolled without any delay after high school and was enrolled in either a 2-year
or a 4-year college in October 1992.4 Notice that enrollment rates are generally high and increase with SAT
scores. For the lowest SAT group, about 80 percent of students enroll in college and this percentage increases
to 96 percent for the highest SAT group.5
For completion rates, we use the Beginning Post-secondary Student Longitudinal Survey (BPS 1995/96),
which collects data on the intensity of college attendance and completion status of post-secondary education
programs for students who enrolled in 1995. As we did for the enrollment rate data, we consider only students
who enroll without delay in either a 2- or a 4-year college following high school graduation. Because we do
not have part-time enrollment in the model, we consider students who enroll exclusively full-time in their
rst academic year and enroll full-time in their rst and last months of enrollment in future academic years.6
The survey records the fraction of students (for each ability group) who, in 2001, report having earned a
bachelor's degree. This is the degree completion rate reported in Table 2. The degree completion rates are
also increasing in SAT score but are signicantly lower than the corresponding enrollment rates. For the
lowest SAT group, the completion rate is 60 percent and it rises to 87 percent for the highest SAT group.
Among the group of students that do not complete (i.e., do not report having earned a bachelor's degree)
there are some that leave shortly after enrolling. These are students who report having last enrolled in
academic years 1995-96 or 1996-97. We refer to this group as leavers. The percentage of leavers in the lowest
SAT group is 9 percent and declines to 1.3 percent for students in the highest SAT group. Some of these
students decide to leave early during college years (1995-96) and some decide to leave late (1996-97).
4In this paper we focus on students with SAT scores above 700. According to the BPS data, 56 percent of students with
scores below 700 enrolled in less than two years of college or enrolled into two-year colleges and dropped out, 45 percent delayed
their enrollment in college and 55 percent did not enroll full-time in the rst semester when they enrolled in college.
5We did not want the college performance of students with very low and very high SAT scores to overly aect the performance
of their respective groups (the 700 900 group and the 1250 1600 group). We employed a 5 percent Winsorization with respect
to SAT scores to reduce the sensitivity of group performance to outliers.
6Since students can enroll full-time but drop out shortly thereafter, \exclusively full-time enrollment in the rst academic
year" simply means that the student is enrolled full-time for the months he or she is actually enrolled. For later academic
years, we weaken the full-time requirement to apply to only the rst and last months of enrollment. This allows students to go
part-time for short stretches of time.
6Table 2: Enrollment, completion and leaving rates
SAT scores 700   900 901   1100 1101   1250 1251   1600
Enrollment rates 0:795 0:894 0:943 0:957
Leaving rates 0:088 0:056 0:025 0:013
Completion rates 0:601 0:720 0:825 0:871
3 Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;2;3;::: The rst two periods are the only periods in which people
make decisions. In period 0, a prospective student makes a one-time decision to enroll in college or not. If
she does not enroll, she can work in a low-paid job with disutility of eort   0 and, starting in period 1;
earn y  0: The earnings y are drawn from a distribution H(y). At the time of the enrollment decision, the
student knows  but not the realization of y.
If the individual chooses to enroll in college, she learns the cost of making eort in college. Eort, e, is
a binary variable that can take values 0 (no eort) or 1 (eort).7 The cost of making an eort is denoted

 and the student draws 
  0 from a distribution G(
). After she learns 
, the student decides whether
to continue on in college or not. If she chooses to leave, she incurs the cost of eort  in the low-paid job
and draws her (life-time) earnings y in period 1. She also incurs some partial college expenses x, where
0 <  < 1.8 At the time of choosing whether to continue in college, the student knows 
 and  but not her
earnings in period 1 and beyond.
If the student continues in college she incurs the annual college cost of x. A continuing student must
choose between putting in eort or not. If she chooses to shirk (e = 0), she will fail with probability 1 but
she will not incur eort costs of any kind in period 0 and will start life in period 1 with an earnings draw y
from the distribution H(y) and a debt of x: If she chooses to put in eort (e = 1), she will complete period
0 with probability  2 (0;1). If she completes successfully, she begins period 1 as a college student with one
more period to go and debt of x (no interest accumulates on the debt as long as the student continues in
college). If she fails to complete, she starts period 1 with an earnings draw y from H(y) and a debt of x:
Figure 1 illustrates this timing of period 0 decisions. In the case in which a student succeeds in completing
the rst year of college, she faces a similar decision tree in period 1 (which we will describe below).
In period 1; a student with one more period to go has to choose again whether to continue in college. If
7Given the large college premium in earnings, we assume that if a student nds it optimal to exert any eort in college, he
or she would want to exert the maximum eort possible. Under this assumption, one can simply take the eort choice to be
binary.
8We assume that if a student voluntarily withdraws from college, he or she pays a cost that is some (relatively small)
proportion of a year's college costs. We x this proportion to be 1=4:
7Figure 1: Timing of decisions
she does not continue, she gets an earnings draw y from the distribution H(y) and starts her life with debt
5x=4. If she continues, she incurs another year of college expense x. And, as in period 0; she must choose
between putting in eort or shirking. If she shirks, she fails with probability 1 but does not incur any eort
cost in period 1 and starts life in period 2 with an earnings draw y from the distribution H(y) and a debt of
2x: If she puts in eort, she completes college with probability . If she succeeds in completing, she draws
her life-time earnings y from the distribution M(y) and has debt of 2x. If she fails to complete college, she
starts period 3 with an earnings draw y from H(y) and a debt of 2x:
In order to describe individuals' decision problems in period 0 and 1 (these are the only periods in which
there are decisions to be made), we will start with describing the utility (payos) to students at the start of
period 1 (students that have one more period of college to go).





82. A student who continues but shirks gets
V S
1 (x) = 

U(y   2x)dH(y):













Turning to period 0; the payos are as follows
1. An individual who does not enroll gets
W() =   + 

U(y)dH(y):
2. An individual who enrolls, but drops out gets
V D
0 (x;) =   +

U(y   x=4)dH(y):
3. An individual who enrolls, continues and shirks gets
V S
0 (x;) =   + 

U(y   x)dH(y):















The structure of payos is generally self-explanatory. One aspect worth remarking on is that leaving or
shirking in period 0 forces the individual to work in the low-paid job for one period. In contrast, if the
student fails in period 1 despite putting in eort, she does not have to work in the low-paid job. This
assumption is a convenient way to capture the fact that exerting eort in college has benets even if it does
not lead to college credits. Also, since anyone who is in college in period 1 must have successfully completed
one period of college (and therefore exerted eort in period 0), she can drop out or shirk and not have to
work in the low-paid job. Thus,  does not appear in either V D
1 (x) or V S
1 (x).
We make the following set of assumptions on the primitives.
9Assumption 1: U(c) : R ! R++ with U0() > 0 and U00() < 0:
Assumption 2: 2 
U(y   2x)dM(y) >






z(y)dH(y) for any z(y) strictly increasing in y (the distribution M
rst-order stochastic dominates the distribution H).
4 College Enrollment, Dropout and Failure Under the Current System
We begin by studying the choice problem in period 1. There are three options open to the student. She
could drop out, or continue on in college but not put in any eort, or she could continue on in college and
exert eort. In our economy since 5x=4 < 2x and  < 1, dropping out is strictly better than shirking in
period 1. Therefore, the problem of the student reduces to choosing between continuing on in college with
eort or dropping out.
Our rst result shows that there is a threshold of eort cost that makes the student indierent between
putting in eort and dropping out: in the case in which the eort cost required in school is low enough, the
student prefers to stay in college and put in eort; otherwise she prefers to drop out. Also, students with
relatively high probability of success tolerate a higher amount of eort in college than students with low
probability of success.
Proposition 4.1. In period 1, there is a cut-o 
1(x;)0 such that for 
 > 
1(x;), students drop out
and for 
  
1(x;) they continue on with eort. Furthermore, 
1(x;) is increasing in .9
It is perhaps worth noting that the threshold 
 will be zero for suciently low probability of success .
Observe that V1(x;0;0) < 0 and, by Assumption 2, V1(x;1;0) > 0. Thus, when no eort in school is required
(
 = 0) there exists 1 > 0 such that V1(x;1;0) = 0: For all  < 1, V E
1 (x;;
) V D
1 (x) < 0 for all 
  0.
Therefore, the threshold 
1(x;) is 0 for all   1.
We now study the choices in period 0. The choice problem can be broken down into two parts. First,
conditional on not putting in eort in college, is it better to drop out or shirk? And, second, given the
answer to the rst question, is it better to put in eort in college?
Proposition 4.2 shows that conditional on not putting in eort in college, some students would rather spend
time in college shirking than dropping out so as to delay paying the cost . Students who choose to do this
are using the student loan program to borrow and consume leisure.
Proposition 4.2. In period 0, there exists a cut-o 0(x) > 0 such that conditional on not putting in eort
9Proofs to all propositions are provided in the Appendix.
10in college students drop out for  < 0(x) and shirk for   0(x).
The next proposition deals with the decision to put in eort in college in period 0. Similarly to period 1,
there is a threshold of eort in period 0 that makes the student indierent between putting in eort and
dropping out and this threshold is higher for students with high probability of success. In addition, this
threshold increases in the eort required in the low-paid job, . For any probability of success, , students
tolerate a higher amount of eort in college if their outside option is worse.
Proposition 4.3. In period 0, there exists a cut-o 
0(x;;)  0 such that for 
 < 
0(x;;) (if applicable),
students put in eort in period 0 and for 
  
0(x;;) they either drop out or shirk. Furthermore, 
0(x;;)
is increasing in  and .
These propositions can be conveniently seen in Figure 2. The left (right) gure presents the choices that
the student makes in period 0 (period 1) in terms of the eort levels required on the job, , and the eort
level required in college, 
. Note that the cut-o of eort in period 0 varies with the amount of eort in the
low-paid job. In addition, for low values of  the outside option to putting in eort in college is dropping
out, whereas for high values of  the outside option to putting in eort in college is shirking. What shirking
delivers in this environment is avoiding both eorts in college and in the low-paid job, and this event occurs
in the case of very high levels of both of these types of eort.
Figure 2: Choices in periods 0 and 1
Propositions 4.1 and 4.3 give us two thresholds for 
. It is important to understand the relationship between
them because it will play an important role in the discussion of optimal insurance. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Assume that  >  1. For suciently low value of , 
0(x;;) < 
1(x;) and for
suciently high value of , 
0(x;;) > 
1(x;).
The signicance of these results is that for a student with 
 < 
0(x;;) < 
1(x;) it is optimal to put in
eort in period 0, and if she successfully completes college in period 0, to also put in eort in period 1. In
11contrast, for a student with 
1(x;) < 
 < 
0(x;;), it is optimal to put in eort in the rst year of college
but then drop out even if he or she is successful. This is a student for whom the cost of eort is high enough
that exerting eort throughout both years of college is not optimal but it is low enough (and disutility from
the low-paid job high enough) that it is optimal to exert eort in the rst year of college and thereby avoid
.
Next we will determine who enrolls in college. Observe that since enrolling in college and then leaving gives
people about the same utility as working, there is a small cost to a student to enroll in college and learn her

. However, if the student's probability of success is suciently low, she may choose not to enroll because
regardless of the value of 
 she will nd it optimal to leave rather than continue with college. Similarly, for a
student of a given probability of success, if the eort in the low-paid job is suciently high, she may choose
to enroll.
The following proposition gives the cut-o value of eort required on the job that makes the student indierent
between working and enrolling in college. For every eort less than that, the student strictly prefers not to
enroll. This cut-o value of eort is lower for students with high probability of success, given their relatively
high expected returns to college investment. Hence, students with high probability of success are more likely
to enroll in college.
Proposition 4.5. In period 0, there exists a cut-o C(x;)  0 such that for  > C(x;) enrolling gives
at least as much utility as working and   C(x;) working gives at least as much utility as enrolling.
Furthermore, C(x;) is decreasing in .
Our model of college enrollment and college completion is consistent with a diversity of student behavior.
First, it predicts that not every student will enroll in college. Second, among those who enroll some will
leave college voluntarily or shirk in period 0. These are the students who discover that their disutility from
putting in eort in college is higher than 
0(x;;). Third, there will be students who continue on in college
(and put in eort) in period 0, but fail to complete their courses satisfactorily with probability 1 . Fourth,
among students who successfully complete their courses in period 0, some will leave college voluntarily in
period 1. These are the students whose disutility from putting in eort in college happens to be between

0(x;;) and 
1(x;). Fifth, there will be students who continue on in college (and put in eort) in period
1, but fail to graduate, with probability 1 . Finally there are students who enroll in college and complete
their degrees. Figure 3 sums up this diversity of behavior as determined by the two types of eort costs, 
and 
.
In what follows, we dene the non-completion rate, n(); as the sum of the fraction of students who enroll
12Figure 3: Choices in college
in college but drop out, shirk or fail in period 0, or drop out or fail in period 1. That is,
n() = [1   G(
0(x;;)] + [1   ]G(
0(x;;)) + G(
0(x;;))
f[1   ~ G(







0(x;;))g is the distribution of 
 conditional on 
 < 
0(x;;).
Next we show that students with high probability of success have lower non-completion rates than students
with low probability of success. This result naturally follows from the fact that students with high probability
of success tolerate high amounts of eort in college in both periods relative to students with low probability
of success. They are more likely to put in eort in college and conditional on putting in eort, they have
higher chances of success.
Proposition 4.6. The non-completion rate n() is decreasing in :
5 Mapping the Model to Data
Our theory implies specic patterns regarding enrollment, non-completion with respect to the probability of
success . We classify prospective students by some observable index of their probability of success in college
conditional on putting in eort { by their scholastic ability. Thus the theory makes predictions about the
variation in student performance across scholastic ability groups as documented in Section 2 in the paper.
In what follows, we will consider the four groups of ability presented in Section 2. We will denote these
groups by the index i 2 f1;2;3;4;g. There are 4 parameters and 4 distributions in the model. Among the
parameters are 2 preference parameters  and  and 2 college parameters x and . Among the distributions
13are distributions for the (unobserved) heterogeneity F() and G(
) and the distributions of earnings of
non-college and college workers H(y) and M(y). We assume that all students have the same preference
parameters and draw from the same distribution of the \outside option" F() but we allow the parameters
x and  and the distributions G(
), H(y) and M(y) to depend on i. Naturally, we expect (i) to increase
with i. We also expect the distribution G(
) to depend on i because the utility cost of exerting eort in
college is, plausibly, more likely to be lower for a student with a higher SAT score. We also expect x to
depend on i because students with higher SAT scores tend to go to more selective colleges and these colleges
tend to have higher tuition.10 This tendency for x to increase with i is partly oset by the tendency of more
selective colleges to provide more nancial aid. Finally, if scholastic ability is correlated with ability more
broadly (as seems plausible), we also expect H(y) and M(y) to depend on i. In particular, we would expect
students with higher SAT scores to be more likely to draw a higher y.
5.1 Preference Parameters, Earnings Distributions and College Costs





(c + )1 =(1   ) if c > 0
1 =(1   ) if c  0
where  is a small positive number. Thus the utility function is dened over the real line but is eectively
CRRA with coecient of relative risk aversion of  for c >> 0. We set  = 2 and  = 0:97, both conventional
values in quantitative macroeconomics.
In the theory, y is the person's lifetime earnings. We calibrate the lifetime earnings distributions using
earnings data from the CPS for 1969-2002 for synthetic cohorts. There are 5000 observations in each year's
sample, on average. We distinguish between two education groups: those with at least 12 years but less
than 16 years of completed schooling and those with at least 16 years of completed schooling. The former
corresponds to the non-college group and the latter to the college group. For each education group, we
calculate the mean real earnings of heads of households who are 25 years old in 1969, 26 years old in 1970,
..., 58 years old in 2002.11 The mean present value of life-cycle earnings for each group is simply the sum of
10We do not explicitly analyze the matching of students of varying ability to colleges of varying selectivity, but our quan-
titative work recognizes the fact that students with similar scholastic abilities tend to sort into similar colleges. For details
on the importance of individual characteristics coupled with college characteristics for college attendance and completion, see
Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2009), Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006), Hoxby (2004) and Light and Strayer (2000).
11To increase the number of observations in each age group, we consider ve-year bins. That is, by age 25 in 1969 we mean
heads of household who are between 23 and 27 years old (both inclusive) in that year. Real values are calculated using the CPI
for 1999.
14the mean earnings at each age.12 For the non-college group mean lifetime earnings is $1:07 million and for
the college group it is $1:69 million. These estimates imply a college premium of 58 percent. Micro-studies
nd that the increase in lifetime earnings from each additional year in college is between between 8 and
13 percent (see Willis (1986) and Card (2001)). Since the average college graduate has more than 4 years
of college education (some students do post-graduate schooling), our calibration of the college premium is
roughly consistent with the high end of this range of estimates.13
To estimate the variation of lifetime earnings around these mean values, we assume that the life-time earnings
of an individual in education group k are given by z(k
25+k
26++k
58), where z is a random variable with
mean 1 and variance 2
z(k) and k
n is the mean earnings in education group k at age n. Then, z(k) is simply
the (common) coecient of variation of earnings at any age n in education group k. We set z(k) equal to
the mean coecient of variation in earnings across all ages in education group k. This construction implies
that the standard deviation of y is $0:8 million for the college group and $0:5 million for the non-college
group.
The above calibration of the mean and standard deviation of lifetime earnings for the two education groups
is for each group as a whole. Within each group, we permit the distribution of lifetime earnings of individuals
to vary systematically with scholastic ability (see Cunha and Heckman (2009), Hendricks and Schoellman
(2009)). We use the data set High School and Beyond (HS&B) to group students by the four ability groups
i 2 f1;2;3;4g and compute the mean earnings for each group of those students who are ve years out
from the year they acquired their highest degree and are employed full-time. We use these mean earnings
to compute the mean earnings of each ability group relative to the overall mean earnings of the education
group in question and then apply these relative mean earnings factors to the mean earnings in the CPS
data for the corresponding education group. This yields (C
i (y);i = 1,2,3,4) = (1:66;1:74;1:84;1:91) and
(NC
i ;i = 1,2,3,4) = (1:05;1:11;1:17;1:21).14 We assume that the standard deviation of earnings for each
ability group is the same as for the group as a whole. Finally, in order to compute the relevant expected
utility values, we assume that all earnings distributions are normal.
The cost for college was $20,706 per year for private universities and $8,275 per year for public universities
in 1999. Among the students who borrowed for their education, 67 percent went to public and 33 percent
to private universities. The enrollment-weighted total college costs are $49,508 in 1999 dollars (College
Board (2001)). We consider heterogeneous costs of college. Using the same enrollment-weighted procedure,
12Ignoring discounting overestimates life-time earnings and ignoring earnings beyond age 58 underestimates it.
13Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) use a 10 percent rate of return, which corresponds to a lifetime college premium of about 1.5.
14We use the HS&B because the B&B data set (which reports earnings for more years) covers only college graduates, while
the BPS data set covers both high school and college graduates but reports earnings only upon graduation. Since earnings
dierentials due to ability are likely to manifest themselves gradually over time, using earnings information from some years
out is preferable. We normalize the units in which earnings are measured in the model so that 1 unit means $1 million.
15we estimate college costs across ability groups using data from the Princeton Review on college rankings in
terms of average SAT scores of accepted students and data from USA Today on college costs (tuition and room
and board). We estimate college costs for the 4 groups of ability levels to be: $35,200, $37,000, $56,400,
and $73,400 (in 1999 dollars). Thus, we nd that high-ability students enroll in more expensive colleges
(more selective colleges tend to be more expensive). We set college costs (in millions) (2xi;i=1,2,3,4) =
(0:0352;0:0370;0:0564;0:0734).
5.2 Completion Probabilities and Distributions of Disutility from Eort
To calibrate i we use the Beginning Post-secondary Student Longitudinal Survey (BPS 1995/96), which
collects data on intensity of college attendance and completion status of post-secondary education programs
for students who enrolled in 1995.
We consider only students who enroll without delay in either 2- or 4-year colleges following high school
graduation. Because we do not have part-time enrollment in the model, we consider students who enroll
exclusively full-time in their rst academic year and enroll full-time in their rst and last months of enrollment
in future academic years.15 The survey records the fraction of students (for each ability group) who, in 2001,
report having earned a bachelor's degree. This is the degree completion rate and for our universe of students
comes out to be (ci;i=1,2,3,4) = (0:601;0:72;0:825;0:871). These rates do not identify i because the
universe includes students who do not put in eort in college; for instance, it includes students who drop
out shortly after enrolling and therefore never earn a degree. To identify i, we rst locate students who,
in 2001, report not having earned a bachelor's degree and who report having last enrolled in academic years
1995-96 or 1996-97. This group is our empirical analog of students who drop out or fail in period 0 or drop
out at the start of period 1. We refer to this group as leavers and their fraction (in our universe of students)
comes out to be (li i=1,2,3,4) = (0:088;0:056;0:025;0:013).16 The complement set is our empirical analog
of students who are in good standing at the start of period 1 and who put in eort in college. Therefore,
we obtain (i i=1,2,3,4) = ((0:601=(1   0:088);0:72=(1   0:056);0:825=(1   0:025);0:871=(1   0:013)) =
(0:659;0:7627;0:8462;0:8825).17 Observe that  is increasing in SAT scores, which justies our initial thought
that SAT scores are an observable proxy for .
The calibration of the distributions F() and Gi(
) is achieved via moment matching. The moments we
15Since students can enroll full-time but drop out shortly thereafter, \exclusively full-time enrollment in the rst academic
year" simply means that the student is enrolled full-time for the months he or she is actually enrolled. For later academic
years, we weaken the full-time requirement to apply to only the rst and last months of enrollment. This allows students to go
part-time for short stretches of time.
16These statistics also re
ect a 5% Winsorization.
17This identication implies that students who are in good standing but do not complete must have performed poorly later
in college. Lack of transcript information on student GPAs or information on the number of credits earned by those who do
not complete college prevents us from verifying this implication. We note, however, that information on self-reported grades
available in the BPS do not show much dierence between completers and non-completers.
16target are enrollment and leaving rates for the four ability groups. Recall that the enrollment rates by our
four ability groups comes out to be (ei i=1,2,3,4) = (0:795;0:894;0:943;0:957).
We assume that F is distributed normal with mean  and standard deviation  and the Gi(
) is distributed
exponential with mean 
i. These distributional assumptions imply that there are 6 parameters to be








wi((ei   ei())2 + vi(li   li())2
!
;
where ei() and li() are the corresponding model rates and wi and vi are the weights assigned to these
rates.
Table 3: Enrollment and leaving rates: model and data
SAT scores 700   900 901   1100 1101   1250  1251
Enrollment rates: Data 0:795 0:894 0:943 0:957
Enrollment rates: Model 0:77 0:908 0:949 0:961
Leaving rates: Data 0:088 0:056 0:025 0:013
Leaving rates: Model 0:088 0:043 0:025 0:013
Table 3 gives the outcome of this moment matching exercise. As is evident, the match between data and model
moments is quite good. We nd the distributions F()  (0:39;0:21) and G1(
)  (0:066), G2(
)  (0:065);
G3(
)  (0:057), and G4(
)  (0:046). Note that means of the 
 distributions decline with ability. This is
consistent with our interpretation of 
 as the utility cost associated with school work. High-ability students
seem to bear fewer costs (i.e., nd the work more enjoyable) than low-ability students.
6 Insuring College Failure Risk
6.1 Theory
Can the student loan program gainfully oer insurance against college failure risk? As noted in the intro-
duction, we wish to answer this question, recognizing that the student loan program cannot redistribute
resources from students with a high probability of success (high ability) to students with a low probability
of success (low ability) and recognizing that insurance against college failure may encourage shirking (and
therefore failure).
It is best to break up the answer into two parts. Consider rst the nature of optimal insurance in period 1
17when loan administrators can observe eort so that moral hazard is not an issue. Conditional on the student
having put in eort, the student loan program gives a transfer f1 to a student if she fails college and collects a
premium s1 if she completes college. Since the insurance is required to be self-nancing (no cross-subsidies),
we must have    s1 + (1   )  f1 = 0. Ignoring the  
 term, expected utility given these transfers is then
 

U(y   2x   [(1   )=]f1)dM(y) + (1   ) 

U(y   2x + f1)dH(y):
Maximizing the above expression with respect to f1 yields the following rst-order condition:

U0(y   2x   [(1   )=]f1)dM(y) =

U0(y   2x + f1)dH(y):
Hence the value of f1 that attains the maximum is the one that equalizes the expected marginal utility of
consumption following failure and success. Denote this value of f1 by f
1. Because there is a college premium
in earnings (meaning that the distribution M(y) rst-order stochastic dominates the distribution H(y)) the
value of f
1 will typically far exceed the cost of college 2x. Henceforth, we will proceed under the assumption
that this is so.
Assumption 5: f
1 > 2x (rst best insurance exceeds college costs)
Since our goal is to study the possibility of oering insurance against the risk of paying for college but failing
to graduate, we limit the maximum insurance that can be oered against failure to 2x. The following is then
true.




is strictly increasing in f1 2 [0;2x]
Proof. The result follows from noting that @V E
1 (x;;
;f1))=@f1 > 0 for all f1 2 [0;2x].
When eort is not observable, however, actuarially fair insurance up to the full cost of college cannot generally
be oered. Under full-cost insurance, a student who shirks receives 

U(y)dH(y). In contrast, the student
gets

U(y  5x=4)dH(y) from dropping out. For  close to 1, shirking will dominate dropping out. In fact,





U(y 5x=4)dH(y) (full-cost insurance makes dropping out better than
shirking)
Thus, with full-cost insurance, students who chose to drop out prior to the introduction of insurance (and
by Proposition 4.4 such students do exist) now may be motivated to shirk instead. If at least some students
18shirk, the failure rate will exceed  and the premia collected will fail to cover loss claims.18
We rst consider optimal insurance schemes that do not induce shirking. This is a restrictive but simpler
problem to analyze. It is simpler because with a \no-shirking" insurance arrangement, the probability
of failure is simply . In contrast, less restrictive insurance schemes may induce shirking and raise the
probability of failure above  since shirkers fail with probability 1. The endogeneity of the failure probability
makes the general insurance problem dicult. The solution to the restrictive\no-shirking"insurance problem
provides some guidance on how to set up the general optimal insurance problem.
We will denote the indemnity in period t (i.e., the payment received in the event of failure in period t) as
ft and the payment in case of success as st. We will assume that students who succeed pay their premia
when they leave college. Assuming that program administrators cannot tell the dierence between genuine
failures and those who fake failure by shirking, the payos in period 1 are as follows:




U(y   5x=4   s0)dH(y):
2. A student who continues but shirks gets
V S
1 (x;f1;s0) = 

U(yN   2x   s0 + f1)dH(y):






U(y   2x   s0   s1)dM(y) +
(1   )

U(y   2x   s0 + f1)dH(y)]:
And the payos in period 0 are as follows:
1. Individuals who do not enroll get
W() =   + 

U(y)dH(y):
18It is not certain that these students will nd it optimal to shirk. The reason is that insurance also increases the value of
putting in eort in college.
192. Students who enroll but leave get
V D
0 (x;) =   +

U(y   x=4)dH(y):
3. Students who enroll, do not leave and shirk get
V S
0 (x;;f0) =   + 

U(y   x + f0)dH(y):











U(y   x + f0)dH(y)]:
Dene the welfare of a student with utility costs (;
) as
W(;x;;



















0 (x;)   V S
0 (x;f0) > 0 for all 
V D
1 (x;s0)   V S
1 (x;s0;f1) > 0
s0   f0(1   ) = 0
s1   f1(1   ) = 0
The no-shirking constraints put upper bounds on the level of insurance that can be oered in periods 0 and
1 as shown in the following two propositions.
Proposition 6.2. In an optimal no-shirking insurance arrangement f0 must be 0 and f1 must be strictly
20less than some level  f1 > 0. Furthermore, the supremum of the no-shirking insurance program exists and
feasible f1 exist that come arbitrarily close to attaining the supremum.
Note that the upper bound of the level of indemnity oered in period 0 such that no shirking occurs is 0,
whereas the upper bound of the level of indemnity oered in period 1 such that no shirking occurs is strictly
positive. The reason for this is that the no-shirking constraint for period 0 depends on the cost of eort in
the low-paid job, . Recall that the benet of shirking in period 0 is to delay the cost of putting in eort
in the low-paid job. Since  has unbounded support, shirking in period 0 occurs for any positive level of
indemnity. In contrast, the no-shirking constraint in period 1 does not depend on  so there is a cut-o of
indemnity level below which dropping out is strictly preferred to shirking.
We now turn to the general insurance problem wherein we allow for insurance levels that induce shirking.
The failure rate will now exceed 1    because shirkers fail with probability 1. Students who succeed must
pay a higher premium to cover the losses imposed by shirkers. This raises two issues. First, the increase in
the cost of insurance might induce more students to shirk and a positive feedback between higher insurance
costs and the measure of shirkers might make it impossible to oer such insurance. Second, even if such
insurance levels are feasible, they may be too costly in terms of the \tax" on the successful students and
worse than \no-shirking" insurance.
We will now permit f = (f0;f1) to be any element of the set [0;x]  [0;2x]. It is helpful to think of the
premia s = (s0;s1) as being made up of two parts. One part is the \base" premia that cover losses when
there is no shirking and is given by b(f) = (b0(f0);b1(f1)) = (=(1   )f0;=(1   )f1). The other part
is the additional premia that need to be collected to cover the losses imposed by shirkers. Denote these as
(f) = (0(f);1(f)).
Dene 
0(x;;;f;b(f)+(f))  0 as the cut-o value of 
 above which an enrolled student will not put in
eort in college in period 0 (i.e., she will either drop out or shirk). This cut-o solves
V E
0 (x;;
;f;b(f) + (f)) = maxfV D
0 (x;);V S
0 (x;;f0)g
The existence of this cut-o follows from the same logic as in Proposition 4.3.
Dene (x;f0) as the cut-o value of  above which, conditional on not putting in eort in college, a student
would prefer to shirk and below which she would prefer to drop out. This cut-o solves
V S
0 (x;;f0) = V D
0 (x;)
21Existence follows from the same logic as in Proposition 4.2.
Finally, dene 
1(x;;f1;b(f) + (f)) as the cut-o value of 
 above which the student does not put eort
in college in period 1. This cut-o solves
V E
1 (x;;
;f1;b(f)+(f)) = V S
1 (x;f1;b0(f0)+0(f0))ff1  f1(f0)g+V D
1 (x;b0(f0)+0(f0))[1 ff1  f1(f0)g]
where ff1  f1(f0)g is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if the expression in fg is true and  f1(f0)
is such that

U(y   5x=4   b0(f0)   0(f0))dH(y)   

(y   2x   b0(f0)   0(f0) +  f1)dH(y) = 0. We have
incorporated the fact that if f1 is at least as large as  f1(f0), the student nds it optimal to shirk. Given an
outside option (dropping out or shirking), existence follows from the same logic as in Proposition 4.1.
We can state the requirement for the feasibility of f.




0(x;;;f;b(f) + (f))  
0(f)
= [1   G(
0(x;;;f;b(f) + (f)))]  [1   F((x;f0))]  f0 (1)
and
  ~ G(
1(x;;f1;b(f) + (f)))  
1(f)
= [1   ~ G(





The term multiplying 
0(f) on the lhs of (3) is the measure of enrolled students who put in eort in period 0
and succeed. Each of them pays the additional premium 
0(f). The term on the rhs of (3) is the measure of
enrolled students who do not put in eort in college and shirk. Each of them collects f0 from the insurance
scheme. For feasibility, the two sides must balance. Similarly, the term multiplying 
1(f) on the lhs of (4)
is the measure of students who put in eort in period 1 and succeed (as before ~ G is the distribution of 

conditional on the set of 
 for which students put in eort in period 0). Each of them pays the additional
premium 
1(f). The term on the rhs of (4) is the measure of students who do not put in eort in period 1.
If the insurance scheme oers f1   f1 then all these students shirk; otherwise they drop out. For feasibility
the two sides must balance.
Let   [0;x]  [0;2x] be the set of f which are feasible.  is non-empty because any insurance scheme in
which f0 = 0 and f1 <  f1,  = (0;0) satises both equations (this is the set of no-shirking insurance levels).













The fact that  is non-empty and that all payos are bounded above by

U(y)dM(y) implies that the
supremum must exist. If no f attains the supremum, insurance levels exist that come arbitrarily close to
attaining it.
Figure 4: Choices when insurance is provided
Figure 4 indicates the eects of optimal insurance. Insurance increases the value of going to college and,
thus, shifts up the 
0 and 
1 loci. Thus, insurance increases the fraction of students putting in eort in both
periods. If optimal insurance requires f0 > 0, then it shifts down the 0 locus { of the students who choose
not to put in eort in college in period 0, a bigger fraction choose to continue on in college and shirk. Both
eects work to lower dropout rates in period 0. Dropout rates also decline in period 1 because 
1 shifts up
and all those who do not put in eort either continue to drop out or shirk { the latter happens if optimal
f1   f1. The eect of optimal insurance on the non-completion rate is ambiguous because it encourages some
students who were dropping out to put in eort (this is the positive eect) and others who were dropping
out to shirk (the negative eect). Of course, optimal insurance raises the enrollment rate.
It is an open question whether optimal insurance should tolerate some amount of shirking. Providing
insurance beyond the\no-shirking"level will encourage more enrollment and more eort in college but it will
also cause some students to shirk and thereby increase the cost of providing the insurance.
Note that the insurance friction about adverse selection is very severe. The friction is simply that some
students who were choosing to drop out may choose to continue on in college without putting in eort (there
23is no change in their college eort decision). Thus, insurance attracts students whose failure probability is 1.
This is an extreme form of adverse selection. On the other hand, moral hazard turns out not to be a severe
problem, as we verify in the quantitative part of the paper. We nd that optimal insurance never encourages
anyone who was putting in eort in college to stop putting in eort. Indeed, it encourages people who were
not putting in eort to put in eort.
Some additional comments are worth making. First, we are implicitly assuming that once a student fails
college, he or she never attempts college again. If we were to relax this assumption, the insurance arrangement
would need to specify that once a student avails herself of insurance, she cannot re-enroll in college without
re-paying the indemnity with interest.
Second, we are abstracting from the adverse eects on the private returns to college education that may
stem from policy-induced increases in college completion rates.19 On the other hand, we are also abstracting
from the myriad social benets of a more educated populace.
Finally, the following caveat should be kept in mind regarding the optimality of the insurance arrangement.
Because higher education is subsidized by federal and state governments, changes in enrollment and com-
pletion rates induced by insurance will change the level of subsidy being received by the higher education
sector. The welfare costs of this additional subsidy are being ignored here.
6.2 Quantitative Findings
What is the value of oering this insurance? In this section we report the quantitative results regarding the
eect of insurance for each of the 4 ability groups in our baseline economy. We follow the structure of the
analysis in Section 6.1. For each ability group (i.e., for each ) we consider the best possible insurance when
(i) eort is observable, (ii) eort is not observable and the insurance must respect the no-shirking constraint,
and (iii) eort is not observable and shirking is tolerated.
6.2.1 Full Insurance
First, we consider the case where eort is observable. The model delivers that the level of insurance that
equates marginal utilities across states, f
i , is 0:076;0:104;0:143;0:172 for i = 1;:::4. These levels are higher
than the cost of college, 2xi, for all ability levels i (they represent 216.5 percent, 280.8 percent, 253.6 percent,
and 234.5 percent of college costs by ability groups). Thus our calibrated economy satises Assumption 5.
So, when eort is observable, it is optimal to insure students of all ability groups up to the full cost of college.
19Card and Lemieux (2001) as well as Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2009) nd evidence of congestion eects in higher
education: an increase in the number of people seeking higher education tends to be associated with a decline in educational
attainment.
246.2.2 No-shirking Insurance
Recall from Proposition 6.2 that an optimal no-shirking insurance must oer f0 = 0 in period 0 and up to  fi1
in period 1, where  fi1 satises

U(y  5xi=4)dHi(y) = 

(y  2xi +  fi1)dHi(y) (here Hi is the non-college
distribution of earnings of ability group i). An important observation is that when this level of insurance
is provided, there is a positive mass of students who are indierent between shirking and dropping out in
each ability group. Our assumption is that if a student is indierent between shirking and dropping out, she
shirks. Given that, we consider giving an indemnity of 1 percent less than the level that makes shirking just
as good as dropping out. Thus, we oer   fi1 = 0:99  fi1 in case of failure and the premium that is paid in case
of success is   si1 = (1   i)   fi1=i.
Table 4 presents the indemnity oered,   fi1, by ability groups, as well as the premium paid in case of success,
  si1, as percentages of the cost of college. The indemnity oered increases in ability, with the top ability
group receiving more than two times more indemnity than the bottom ability group. However, given that
the college cost increases in the ability level, each ability group is forgiven a roughly constant fraction of
their college cost in the case where failure occurs. The bottom/highest ability group is forgiven 23.3/24.6
percent of their college cost. The insurance, however, is more expensive for the low-ability groups relative
to the high-ability groups: the premium is 12.1 percent of the college cost for the bottom ability group and
only 3.3 percent of the college cost for the top ability group.
Table 5 displays how enrollment, leaving and completion rates change with the insurance. Since insurance
increases the value of putting in eort in college, given  there is less chance a student will want to drop out
of college. Thus, there is a tendency for leaving rates to go down and completion rates to go up. On the other
hand, there is a selection eect working in the opposite direction. Because insurance increases the value of
putting in eort in college, it also increases enrollment. The new enrollees are students with low values of .
Since the 
0(x;;) locus is increasing in , the new enrollees are more likely to drop out in period 0. For the
rst three ability groups, the rst eect dominates and insurance causes leaving rates to fall and completion
rates to rise. For the top ability group, the second eect is decisive. For this group, insurance encourages
everyone to enroll and there is a suciently large increase in the share of \low " students so that leaving
rates rise and completion rates fall.
Table 5 also displays the welfare gain from insurance, namely, the percentage increase in welfare with insur-
ance relative to the no-insurance (baseline) model. As we might expect, the insurance is most valuable to
students with a high probability of failure and, indeed, the welfare gains decline with rising ability.20
20These gains are in the nature of social welfare gains where the social welfare function treats students with dierent  values
symmetrically.
25Table 4: No-shirking insurance
SAT scores 700   900 901   1100 1101   1250  1251
Indemnity f1 0.0082 0.0084 0.0134 0.018
Percentage of 2x 23.34 22.74 23.7 24.55
Premium s1 0.0043 0.0026 0.0024 0.0024
Percentage of 2x 12.08 7.61 4.31 3.27
Table 5: Enrollment, leaving and completion rates: no-shirking insurance
SAT scores 700   900 901   1100 1101   1250  1251
Enrollment rates with insurance 0:848 0:924 0:965 1
Enrollment rates: data 0:795 0:894 0:943 0:957
Leaving rates with insurance 0:032 0:030 0:020 0:015
Leaving rates: data 0:088 0:056 0:025 0:013
Completion rates with insurance 0:638 0:740 0:829 0:870
Completion rates: data 0:601 0:720 0:825 0:871
Welfare gains in percentage 2:83 2:38 2:06 1:86
6.2.3 Optimal Insurance
We consider the general insurance case where fi 2 [0;x]  [0;2xi]. For comparison purposes, we rst show
the results if insurance is oered only in period 1.
The rst task is to determine the set of feasible insurance schemes for each ability group. When insurance
is oered only in period 1, an insurance arrangement f = (0;f1), f1 2 [0;2xi], is feasible if there exists a

i1(f) such that equation (4) is satised for ability group i. Obviously, any fi1 <  fi1 is feasible because
there is no shirking and 1 = 0 will trivially satisfy the feasibility condition. To determine feasibility for
f1   fi, we divide [  fi1;2xi] into a ne grid and for each grid point attempt to nd a  that satises (4). Our
procedure is to iterate on 1. For iteration k, we set k
1 to the value that satises (4) given the decision rules
corresponding to 1 from iteration k   1 (i.e., 
k 1
1 ). We start the iterations with 0
1 = 0. If this iterative
process converges we classify that particular grid point as feasible. If the process diverges, we classify it as
infeasible.
We nd that the feasible indemnity levels f1 2 [  f1;2x] dier across ability groups. These sets turn out to
be ;, [23:8;29:8], [24;34:8], [25:9;50:5] (numbers are given in % of the college cost, 2xi) for i = 1,2,3,4. No
insurance including and beyond  f11 is feasible for the lowest ability group. For the other three ability groups,
insurance levels beyond  fi1 are feasible. More f are feasible for higher ability levels.
These sets highlight the adverse selection problem. In the bottom ability group the probability of success 
is low. A low  means that 
1, the threshold above which a person does not put in eort in college, is low.
26Table 6: Optimal insurance: periods 0 and 1
SAT scores 700   900 901   1100 1101   1250 1251   1600
f

0 as percentage of 2x 29.83 10.27 11.26 13
s

0 as percentage of 2x 15.44 3.2 2.05 1.73
f

1 as percentage of 2x 15.99 18.38 21.01 30.65
s

1 as percentage of 2x 8.28 5.72 3.82 4.1


0 as percentage of 2x 0.50 0.045 0.0062 0.0042

1 as percentage of 2x 0 0 0 0.125
Furthermore, the mean of the G distribution for the lowest ability group is the highest. These two factors
combine to make the mass of students who drop out in period 1 the highest for the lowest ability group.
When insurance beyond  f11 is oered, all these students shirk. Thus there is a large jump in the measure
of shirkers. This requires that 1 be increased signicantly above zero to balance (4). A higher 1 decreases
the number of students who put in eort in college and increases the number of students who wish to shirk.
This makes the jump in 1 in the next iteration even higher still. This process of higher and higher jumps in
1 means that no insurance beyond  f11 can be oered. In contrast, the successive increases in 1 get smaller
(and eventually converge to 0) for the other three ability groups { owing to the fact that 
1 threshold is
higher and the mean of the G distribution is lower.
Even though insurance higher than or equal to  fi1 is feasible for the top 3 ability groups, we nd that it
is not optimal to oer such insurance. Thus the optimal insurance scheme, even if we allow for shirking in
period 1, is to oer the best no-shirking insurance. Although insurance provides benets for students who
put in eort in college, the fact that students have to pay more than the actuarially fair insurance price
(1 > 0) makes the net benet of insurance at or beyond  fi1 (i = 2;3;4) negative.
We turn now to the full insurance problem with shirking when insurance is oered in both periods. The
calculation of feasible f is a natural extension of the method described above. For each ability group, we
start with (0;1) = (0;0) and iterate on equations (3) and (4) simultaneously. If convergence is achieved,
the f is classied as feasible. We nd that a higher f0 is associated with a lower f1: if more insurance is
oered in period 0, less can be oered in period 1. The reason is that period 0 insurance encourages more
people to put in eort in college in period 0 and, if successful, to drop out in period 1. Thus, it increases
the mass of potential shirkers in period 1 and therefore increases the cost of providing insurance beyond
the \no-shirking" level. As examples, Figure 5 shows the sets of feasible f (shown in white), Figure 6 shows
the associated 0 and 1, and Figure 7 presents welfare for feasible combinations of (f0;f1) (including the
optimal mix) for ability levels 2 and 4.
Table 6 presents the optimal mix of indemnity oered (f
0;f





27Figure 5: Feasible sets (in white) when insurance is provided
Combinations of feasible (f0,f1)
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Note: The left panel is for ability level 2 and the right panel for ability level 4.
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Note: The top panel is for ability level 2 and the bottom panel for ability level 4.
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Note: The left panel is for ability level 2 and the right panel for ability level 4.
It is optimal to oer signicant amounts of insurance in periods 0 and 1. Since any positive insurance in
period 0 induces shirking, the optimal insurance scheme tolerates some shirking in period 0 for every ability
group. In period 1, for ability groups i = 1,2,3 the insurance oered in period 1 is just short of the level
that would induce shirking. This is similar to the situation when insurance is oered in period 1 only, except
that the \no-shirking" insurance levels are now lower. The reason is that students who succeed in college in
period 0 owe the period 0 insurance premium. All else remaining the same, this reduces the value of putting
in eort in college in period 1 and therefore it lowers the 
 threshold above which it is better to drop out.
Thus the\no-shirking"insurance levels for period 1 are lower than they would be if no insurance is oered in
period 0. As in the case when insurance is oered in period 1 only, oering insurance beyond the no-shirking
level in period 1 is too costly for the rst three ability groups. The exception to this is the top ability group.
For this group, the measure of potential shirkers in period 1 is low enough that it is optimal to go beyond
the no-shirking insurance level.
Insurance oered is generally increasing in ability. This is true for insurance oered in period 1 and is true
for insurance oered in period 0 for the top three ability groups. Adverse selection becomes less important
as ability rises and, therefore, more generous insurance can be oered. The exception to this general rule
is the lowest ability group for which the insurance oered in period 0 is quite high (higher than what is
oered for any of the other ability groups). This happens because failure probability for this group is high
and insurance in period 0 is more valuable than insurance in period 1.
Table 7 gives the enrollment, leaving and completion rates for optimal insurance. A comparison with Table
5 indicates that optimal insurance has virtually the same eects as insurance in period 1 only. There is an
increase in enrollment and completion rates relative to the data for the bottom three ability groups. The
29Table 8: Welfare changes: insurance with shirking
SAT scores 700   900 901   1100 1101   1250 1251   1600
Relative to baseline model 3.54 2.66 2.28 2.01
Relative to no-shirking insurance 0.73 0.29 0.23 0.15
top ability group behaves dierently with respect to leaving and completion but this is due to the fact that
there are more \low " students post insurance (the enrollment probability is 1).
Table 7: Enrollment, leaving and completion rates: insurance
SAT scores 700   900 901   1100 1101   1250 1251   1600
Enrollment rates with ins 0:869 0:924 0:966 1
Enrollment rates : data 0:795 0:894 0:943 0:957
Leaving rates with ins 0:027 0:029 0:020 0:012
Leaving rates: data 0:088 0:056 0:025 0:013
Completion rates with ins. 0:636 0:740 0:830 0:870
Completion rates: data 0:601 0:720 0:825 0:871
Shirking rates 0:187 0:46 0:06 0:35
In the aggregate, optimal insurance induces an increase in enrollment rates from 89.9 percent to 93.4 percent.
On average, 0.57 percent students shirk. Out of everyone who enrolls, only 2.36 percent decide to leave college
compared to 4.11 percent in the case where insurance is not oered. The average completion rate increases
from 74.9 percent to 76.1 percent out of everyone who enrolls. The combination of these eects delivers the
result that the percentage of high school graduates who acquire a college degree increases from 67.3 percent in
the benchmark economy to 71.1 percent. Oering insurance increases the value of putting in eort in college
and thus induces more people to stay in college. This induces an increase in completion rates. Although
some of the marginal students who decide to enroll and stay in college with insurance may decide to shirk
and thus will counteract the positive eect on completion rates, this negative eect is secondary.
Table 8 displays the welfare gains from optimal insurance across ability groups. Two comparisons are
presented. The rst line displays the welfare gain relative to the baseline model. As one would expect the
gain is largest for the lowest ability group and the gains decline with ability. The next line displays the
gains relative to the no-shirking insurance arrangement. The gains are much smaller, indicating that the
no-shirking insurance arrangement captures most of the welfare gains. In the aggregate, there is a welfare
gain of 2.7 percent on average in the optimal contract relative to the baseline economy.
307 Sensitivity Analysis
7.1 Behavior of the lowest ability group
The insurance indemnity is increasing in ability, with the exception of the insurance oered in period 0 for
the lowest ability group, which is quite high (29 percent of the college cost). This is explained by the very
low probability of success for this group of students. In addition, the adverse selection problem for this
group is not very severe in period 0. The majority of the students who leave college, decide to do so later
during college years. The model predicts that 7.2 percent of student leave college in period 1 and only 1.6
percent leave college in period 0. For the estimated economy, the students in the lowest ability group benet
from staying in college longer and then leave without acquiring a degree. As a result, the potential mass of
shirkers is not large in period 0. While this fact is in line with the data (where these percentages are 4.6
percent and 4.2 percent), the gap between early and late leavers is overestimated in the model.
It is reasonable to believe that students with SAT scores below 900 may have a dierent outside option
than the other ability groups. Also the structure of the eort requirements during college years may be
dierent for this group of students. In particular, a large fraction of these students decide to switch to
dierent schools and obtain their degrees from a dierent institution.21 Thus, in order to better capture the
behavior of the lowest ability group, we conduct the following sensitivity analysis: we modify the problem
for the lowest ability group in one important way: we assume that the student draws a disutility from eort
in period 0 in college and once she is in good standing in period 1 in college, she again draws a disutility
from putting in eort in college during this period.
Our structure for this problem becomes: rst, the student draws a disutility from working in the low paid
job,  from a distribution F()  (;) and decides to enroll in college. Second, conditional on enrolling,
the student draws 
 from G0(
). She makes a decision to leave, stay and put in eort or shirk. At this point,
the student understands that her eort for the next period, if she manages to be a student in good standing
at the start of the following period, will be drawn from a dierent distribution G1(
). If she chooses to stay
and put in eort and successfully completes the rst part of college, she then will draw a new disutility of
eort and has to make a decision again whether to leave, stay and put in eort or shirk, based on this new
draw.
As before, we assume that F is distributed normal with mean  and standard deviation  and the Gi(
) are
distributed exponentially with mean 
i. These distributional assumptions imply that there are 4 parameters
21According to our ndings from the BPS data, 49 percent of the students with SAT scores between 700 and 900 in our
sample switch to a dierent institution.
31to be constrained by 4 moments. We apply the same procedure as in the baseline economy and jointly estimate
these parameters to match data moments.
As evident from Table 9, the match between data and model moments improves for the lowest ability
group, especially regarding early and late leaving rates. We nd the distributions F()  (0:45;0:22) and
G0(
)  (0:121), G1(
)  (0:054). Note that the 
 distribution presents a lower mean later during college
years. This is consistent with our conjecture that these students may switch to less demanding schools. Also,
the outside option for this group of students is much worse than for any other ability group. Recall that
this ability group has a low probability of success; also completing the rst part of college is good for them.
So they need a worse outside option than other groups to enroll in college and they also need a relatively
high eort in period 0 in college (relative to period 1) so that after enrolling in college, a substantial fraction
decides to leave in period 0. Once they stay for the rst part of college, however, in order for them to stay
in the second part, they need a much lower eort required. Otherwise they will leave in large numbers given
the very low probability of success.
Table 9: Enrollment, leaving and completion rates for the lowest ability group
SAT scores Data Model - new estimation Insurance
Enrollment rates 0:795 0:8015 0:8643
Leaving rates 0:088 0:0853 0:0466
Early leaving rates 0:040 0:0401 0:0319
Late leaving rates 0:046 0:0452 0:0147
Completion rates 0:601 0:603 0:6275
Shirking rates 0:0012
We next search for the optimal mix of indemnity oered (f
0;f





1), using the same procedure as before. Table 10 presents the outcome. Since the potential mass
of shirkers is larger in period 0 and lower in period 1 relative to the economy presented in Section 6.2.3,
relatively less indemnity can be oered in period 0 and slightly more indemnity can be oered in period
1 in the current economy. As a result, insurance indemnity is monotone in ability. As Table 9 shows, the
eects of insurance on enrollment rates are comparable to the results obtained in Section 6.2.3. However,
fewer students decide to stay in college, and thus completion rates are relatively lower. Our results deliver
an improvement in welfare of 2.73 percent for the lowest ability group compared to 3.54 percent obtained
in Section 6.2.3. The dierence arises from underestimating the severity of the adverse selection problem in
period 0 for the lowest ability group.
32Table 10: Optimal insurance: periods 0 and 1 for the lowest ability group
SAT scores 700   900
f

0 as percentage of 2x 8.81
s

0 as percentage of 2x 4.56
f

1 as percentage of 2x 16.73
s

1 as percentage of 2x 8.66


0 as percentage of 2x 0.16

1 as percentage of 2x 0
Welfare change relative to baseline 2.725
7.2 Insuring both failures and dropouts
Students in our economy face two sources of risks: the risk of failing from college and the risk of a high 
. Our
scheme provides insurance against the rst source of risk. Thus we take a conservative approach to the issue
at hand { quantifying the welfare gains from oering insurance. In this section we extend our mechanism
to also include insurance against the shock of the disutility of putting eort in college. Specically, in our
baseline economy, the student who decides to leave college in period 1 owes a premium since she beneted
from insurance in period 0. We modify this problem and assume that the student benets of insurance and
collects indemnity f0 rather than pays premium s0 and the additional amount 0. We study this insurance
mechanism and discuss relevant dierences to the environment presented before.
The payos in period 1 are as follows:




U(y   5x=4 + f0)dH(y):
2. A student who continues but shirks gets
V S
1 (x;f1;s0) = 

U(yN   2x   s0 + f1)dH(y):






U(y   2x   s0   s1)dM(y) +
(1   )

U(y   2x   s0 + f1)dH(y)]:
33And the payos in period 0 are as follows:
1. Individuals who do not enroll get
W() =   + 

U(y)dH(y):
2. Students who enroll but leave get
V D
0 (x;) =   +

U(y   x=4)dH(y):
3. Students who enroll, do not leave and shirk get
V S
0 (x;;f0) =   + 

U(y   x + f0)dH(y):











U(y   x + f0)dH(y)]:
Dene the welfare of a student with utility costs (;
) as
W(;x;;





As before f = (f0;f1) is any element of the set [0;x]  [0;2x] and the premia s = (s0;s1) is made up of two
parts. One part is the \base" premia that cover losses when the pool is composed only of students who put
in eort and is given by b(f) = (b0(f0);b1(f1)) = (=(1 )f0;=(1 )f1). The other part is the additional
premia,(f) = (0(f);1(f)) that need to be collected each period to cover the losses imposed by shirkers
and dropouts in period 1.
Dene 
0(x;;;f;b(f)+(f))  0 as the cut-o value of 
 above which an enrolled student will not put in
34eort in college in period 0 (i.e., she will either drop out or shirk). This cut-o solves
V E
0 (x;;
;f;b(f) + (f)) = maxfV D
0 (x;);V S
0 (x;;f0)g
The existence of this cut-o follows from the same logic as in Proposition 4.3.
Dene (x;f0) as the cut-o value of  above which, conditional on not putting in eort in college, a student
would prefer to shirk and below which she would prefer to drop out. This cut-o solves
V S
0 (x;;f0) = V D
0 (x;)
Existence follows from the same logic as in Proposition 4.2.
Finally, dene 
1(x;;f1;b(f)+(f)) as the cut-o value of 
 above which the student does not put in eort
in college in period 1. This cut-o solves
V E
1 (x;;
;f1;b(f) + (f)) = V S
1 (x;f1;b0(f0) + 0(f0))ff1  f1(f0)g + V D
1 (x;f0)[1   ff1  f1(f0)g]





(y  2x b0(f0) 0(f0)+  f1)dH(y) = 0. We have incorporated
the fact that if f1 is at least as large as  f1(f0), the student nds it optimal to shirk. Given an outside option
(dropping out or shirking), existence follows from the same logic as in Proposition 4.1.
We can state the requirement for the feasibility of f.




0(x;;;f;b(f) + (f)))[ ~ G(
1(x;;f1;b(f) + (f))  
0(f) +
[1   ~ G(
1(x;;f1;b(f) + (f)))]  ff1  f1g]
0(f)
= [[1   G(
0(x;;;f;b(f) + (f)))]  [1   F((x;f0))] + (3)
  G(
0(x;;;f;b(f) + (f)))[1   ~ G(
1(x;;f1;b(f) + (f)))][1   ff1  f1g])]  f0
and
  ~ G(
1(x;;f1;b(f) + (f)))  
1(f)
= [1   ~ G(





35The term multiplying 
0(f) on the lhs of (3) is the measure of enrolled students who put in eort in period
0 and succeed and are not going to dropout in period 1. Each of them pays the additional premium 
0(f).
The term on the rhs of (3) is the measure of enrolled students who do not put in eort in college in period
0 and shirk in period 0 or who put in eort in college in period 0, succeed in period 0 and drop in period 1.
Each of them collects f0 from the insurance scheme. For feasibility, the two sides must balance. Similarly,
the term multiplying 
1(f) on the lhs of (4) is the measure of students who put in eort in period 1 and
succeed (as before ~ G is the distribution of 
 conditional on the set of 
 for which students put in eort in
period 0). Each of them pays the additional premium 
1(f). The term on the rhs of (4) is the measure of
students who do not put in eort in period 1. If the insurance scheme oers f1   f1, then all these students
shirk. For feasibility the two sides must balance.
Under this insurance scheme students who are successful in period 0 and decide to leave in period 1
collect the indemnity f0 instead of paying the additional amount 0 (as in the case discussed before). This
will restrict the range of feasible indemnity levels in period 0. At the same time, given that these students
are treated relatively well under the current scheme relative to the one presented before, the \no shirking
constraint" is less likely to bind, and so insurance in period 1 is less restricted. In addition, some of the
students who chose to leave in period 0 in the baseline economy and might have been induced to shirk with
the general insurance may choose to put in eort in period 0 and leave in period 1 under the current insurance
scheme. This may alleviate the adverse selection problem in period 0 relative to the insurance mechanism
presented before. Similarly, students who chose to leave in period 1 in the baseline economy and had the
incentive to shirk in period 1 with the general insurance may be less inclined to do so under the current
scheme since the value of leaving in period 1 is higher. Thus, the adverse selection problem in period 1 may
also be less severe relative to the insurance mechanism presented before. We next analyze the quantitative
implications of these incentives.
Given the specics of the behavior for the lowest ability group discussed in the previous section, we restrict
attention in the current sensitivity analysis to oering insurance for the top 3 ability groups. Table 11 reports
the optimal indemnity levels, the base premia and the additional amounts that need to be collected.
Table 11: Optimal insurance: periods 0 and 1
SAT scores 901   1100 1101   1250 1251   1600
f

0 as percentage of 2x 10.27 11.6 14.71
s

0 as percentage of 2x 3.2 2.11 1.96
f

1 as percentage of 2x 27.03 31.15 35.7
s

1 as percentage of 2x 8.41 5.66 4.75


0 as percentage of 2x 0.032 0.13 0.07

1 as percentage of 2x 0 0 0
36Note that the optimal indemnity oered in period 1, f

1 is much higher for all ability groups relative to the
one oered under the insurance scheme presented in Section 6.2.3. As mentioned, more schemes are feasible
in this period. Since the value of leaving in period 1 is higher, the adverse selection problem in period 1 is less
severe. At the same time, the indemnity oered in period 0 has similar values as before, but the additional
amount collected diers from before. On the one hand, this additional amount has to cover students who
decide to leave in period 1 in addition to those who shirk in period 0; this fact increases 

0. This eect
depends on the amount of leavers in period 1, which in turn is aected by the increase in the value from
leaving college in period 1. On the other hand, some of the potential shirkers in period 0 may be inclined
to put in eort in period 0 and leave in period 1 under the current insurance scheme and this lowers 

0.
Table 12 reports the enrollment, leaving, shirking and completion rates under the current insurance scheme
and compares the results to those obtained in the insurance scheme presented in Section 6.2.3. Note that
shirking rates are lower relative to those induced by the previous insurance scheme. At the same time the
leaving rates are higher relative to those induced before. Consequently completion rates have similar values
as before. Given these eects on behavior and the fact that, under the current scheme, insurance indemnities
are more generous, there are larger welfare gains relative to the baseline economy under the current scheme
compared to the gains induced by the previous insurance scheme.
Table 12: Enrollment, leaving and completion rates: insurance
SAT scores 901   1100 1101   1250 1251   1600
Enrollment rates with current ins 0:924 0:966 1
Enrollment rates with prev ins 0:924 0:996 1
Leaving rates with current ins 0:035 0:026 0:015
Leaving rates with prev ins 0:029 0:020 0:012
Completion rates with current ins. 0:736 0:824 0:869
Completion rates with prev ins 0:740 0:830 0:870
Shirking rates with current ins. 0:34 0:055 0:1
Shirking rates with prev. ins. 0:46 0:06 0:35
Welfare change relative to baseline with current ins. 2.85 2.42 2.27
Welfare change relative to baseline with prev. ins. 2.66 2.28 2.01
8 Conclusion
A large fraction of students who enroll in college do not earn a degree. Many of these students borrow money
to nance their (failed) college education. However, there is no insurance market against this particular risk.
The focus of our paper is to explore one of the reasons why this market is missing: there may not be much
value from oering such an insurance. We assume that students are cognizant of the fact that borrowing
to go to college is a risky endeavor. Our paper examines { theoretically and quantitatively { if the risk of
37failing to complete college (college failure risk) can be, at least partially, insured and quanties the value of
oering such an insurance.
We conduct the analysis under two constraints on the provision of failure insurance. First, we assume that
any insurance scheme cannot redistribute resources from students with a high probability of completing
college to students with a low probability of completing college. Second, the insurance program must guard
against adverse selection: the possibility that poor risks will attempt to pool with the good risks when
insurance is oered and against moral hazard: insurance may induce students to stop putting in eort in
college.
We develop a model of student enrollment and eort decisions. Our model is consistent with a diversity of
behavior on the part of students. We develop the notion of optimal insurance against college failure risk,
taking into account the two constraints noted above. Our model predicts that some amount of insurance
against failure risk is desirable and can be oered. Also, the optimal insurance scheme may tolerate some
amount of adverse selection (the pooling of bad risks with good ones). We calibrate our model of student
enrollment and eort decisions to match data on US college enrollment, leaving and completion rates. Using
the calibrated model, we compute the optimal insurance and quantify the eect of optimal insurance on these
rates as well as on welfare. We nd that optimal insurance increases enrollment rates by 3.5 percentage points
and increases college completion rates by 1.2 percentage points. Although insurance draws in students with
a high risk of failure, the completion rate rises because fewer students drop out voluntarily from college. On
average, welfare increases by 2.7 percent. We also present results broken down by ability groups. Students
with relatively low scholastic ability and a high failure probability benet the most from failure insurance.
Since these students are typically from low-income backgrounds and most are in need of loans to nance
the expense of a college education, our results suggest that insurance against college failure risk will be
particularly useful to students from low-income backgrounds.
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A Appendix
In this section we provide proofs for the propositions presented in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Since 5x=4 < 2x and  < 1, V D
1 (x) > V S
1 (x). Hence, dropping out is strictly
better than shirking in period 1. Therefore, the student chooses between continuing on with eort or dropping
out. Denote the dierence in payos between these two choices by V1(x;;





) is continuous and strictly decreasing in 
 2 [0;1). If V1(x;;0)  0, then 
1(x;) = 0. If
V1(x;;0) > 0, by continuity and strict monotonicity with respect to 
, there exists a unique ^ 
 > 0 such
that V1(x;; ^ 
) = 0. Hence 
1(x;) > 0.
To prove 











U(y   2x)dH(y)  

U(y   x)dH(y):
40By Assumption 2, V1(x;;
) is strictly increasing in . Now consider ^  < ~ . If V1(x; ^ ;0) < V1(x; ~ ;0)  0,
then 
1(x; ^ ) = 
1(x; ~ ) = 0. If V1(x; ^ ;0)  0 < V1(x; ~ ;0), then 0 = 
(x; ^ ) < 
(x; ~ ). Finally, if
0 < V1(x; ^ ;0) < V1(x; ~ ;0); then 0 < 
(x; ^ ) < 
(x; ~ ). This establishes that 
(x;) is increasing in .
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Consider the function V D
0 (x;) V S











U(y x)dH(y) > 0. By continuity and strict monotonicity with respect to , there
exists 0(x) > 0 such that V D
0 (x;0(x))   V S
0 (x;0(x)) = 0: For any  below this cut-o, dropping out is
strictly preferred to shirking and at or above this cut-o, shirking is weakly or strictly preferred to dropping
out.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Consider the function V0(x;;
;) = V E
0 (x;;
)   max[V D
0 (x;);V S
0 (x;)]
which is continuous for all (;
;) 2 [0;1]  [0;1)  [0;1) and strictly increasing in  (by Assumption
2), strictly decreasing in 
 and strictly increasing in . If V0(x;;0;)  0, then 
0(x;;) = 0. If
V0(x;;0;) > 0; by continuity and strict monotonicity with respect to 
 there exists a unique ^ 
 > 0 such
that V0(x;; ^ 
;) = 0: Thus, 
0(x;;) > 0.
The fact that 
0(x;;) is increasing in  can be established exactly along the lines of the proof given in
Proposition 4.1.
To prove 
0(x;;) is increasing in , consider ~  < ^ . If V0(x;;
; ~ ) < V0(x;;
; ^ )  0, then 
0(x;; ~ ) =

0(x;; ^ ) = 0. If V0(x;;
; ~ )  0 < V0(x;;
; ^ ), then 0 = 
0(x;; ~ ) < 
0(x;; ^ ). Finally, if 0 <
V0(x;;
; ~ ) < V0(x;;
; ^ ) then 0 < 
0(x;; ~ ) < 
0(x;; ^ ). This establishes that 
0(x;;) is increasing
in .
Proof of Proposition 4.4. We will evaluate V0(x;;
;) at the value of 
 for which the student is indierent
between putting in eort or dropping out in period 1.











U(y 5x=4)dH(y)]: This implies that for  suciently close to 0, V0(x;;
1(x;);) <
0. Hence, for  suciently small, 
0(x;;) < 
1(x;).







This implies that for  suciently large V0(x;;




























Let  increase by  > 0. Consider the eect of this change on VC(x;;) in 2 parts:
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Observe that the above change is non-negative because the positive term contributes  while the negative
 term contributes either -G(
0(x;;)) (in the case where + < 0) or  G(
0(x;;)) (in the case
where  +  0). Furthermore, the term [VC(x;; +)   VC(x;; +)] is non-negative by optimality.
Hence, VC(x;; + )   VC(x;;)  0. Thus VC(x;;) is increasing in .
Since VC(x;;) is increasing in ; if enrolling is optimal for some ; enrolling must also be optimal for any
^  greater than . Therefore, there must be a cut-o value C(x;)  0 such that for all  > C(x;) the
student will nd it optimal to enroll and for   C(x;) the student will nd it optimal to not enroll.
To establish that the threshold is decreasing in  observe that V E
0 (x;;
) is strictly increasing in  and,
therefore, VC(x;;) is strictly increasing in . It follows that the cut-o C(x;) cannot be strictly increasing
in .
Proof of Proposition 4.6. The expression for n() simplies to 1   2G(
0(x;;)) ~ G(
1(x;)). Substi-
42tuting in the expression of ~ G(
) we get









= 1   2 minfG(
0(x;;));G(
1(x;))g




Proof of Proposition 6.2. Consider the incentive constraint in period 0. This constraint requires that
 (1   )= +

U(y   x=4)dH(y)   








U(y x)dH(y) > 0, for any f0 > 0, there exists a (f0) such that the constraint
holds exactly. Since the distribution F() has unbounded support the constraint is violated for all   (f0).




U(y   5x=4)dH(y)   

(y   2x)dH(y) > 0, there exists  f1 > 0 such that

U(y   5x=4)dH(y)  


(y   2x +  f1)dH(y) = 0. For f1   f1, the period 1 no-shirking constraint is violated. Thus, the optimal
\no-shirking" f1 must be less than  f1.
Since payos are bounded above by the quantity

U(y)dM(y) (the expected utility of a person with a college











is bounded above by the same quantity for every feasible choice of f1. Thus the set of attainable ex-ante
utility must have a least upper bound.
From Assumption 6 we have that  f1 < 2x. By Lemma 6.1 we have V E
1 (x;;
;0;0;=(1 )f1;f1) is strictly
increasing in f1 2 [0;  f1). Thus, ex-ante utility is strictly increasing in f1 2 [0;  f1). It follows that the
supremum is not attained by any feasible f1 but f1 exist that come arbitrarily close to attaining it.
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